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ARGUMENT
Through his Petition for Rehearing, Searles claims
that this Court improperly failed to consider the issue of
impossibility of performance in reaching its decision to affirm
the dismissal of Searles' case. Searles does not, however,
explain how this issue affects the Court's analysis of the case
or the Court's decision to affirm the trial court*

Searles has

not established that the trial court erred in any of its rulings
or that the case should be remanded for further proceedings.
The issue of impossibility of performance is moot
because Searles failed to present the issue to the trial court.
Even if Searles had presented the issue to the trial court and
preserved the issue for appeal, the defense of impossibility of
performance is inapplicable in the present case.
I.

Searles Failed to Preserve the Issue of Impossibility
of Performance for Appeal.
The issue of impossibility of performance was raised

for the first time in this case in response to a hypothetical
question from the bench during oral argument on appeal. At
trial, Searles did not assert or argue the contractual defense
of impossibility of performance.

It is well established that

the court will not consider a new argument for the first time on
appeal.

See, e.g., Wurst v. Department of Employment Security,

818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Ct. App. Utah 1991); Progressive
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Acquisitions, Inc. v. Lvtle, 806 P.2d 239, 242 (Ct. App. Utah
1991) .
Searles' Petition for Rehearing appears to be based
upon a statement in this Court's Memorandum Decision that
Searles "failed to plead impossibility of performance at trial."
(Petition, p.6). Searles argues that he was not required by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to file a written response to
certain defenses asserted by Dayna in its Answer and, therefore,
was not required to "plead" impossibility in the trial court.
Searles misses the point.

Issues or matters not

presented to the trial court may not be raised for the first
time on appeal.

Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, 818

P.2d 1036, 1039 (Ct. App. Utah 1991) ("It is well-settled that
the court will not address an issue raised for the first time on
appeal."); Progressive Acquisitions, Inc. v. Lvtle, 806 P.2d
239, 242 (Ct. App. Utah 1991) ("It is axiomatic that matters not
presented to the trial court may not be raised for the first
time on appeal.").

Searles is not precluded from arguing

impossibility of performance on appeal because he did not
include the defense in a written pleading.

Rather, Searles is

so precluded because the entire issue of impossibility was not
presented to the trial court.

Because the trial court never

considered or ruled on the issue of impossibility of
performance, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the
argument on appeal.
-2-

Although his precise theory is unclear, Searles
appears to argue that he was not required to present the issue
of impossibility to the trial court because he was "saving" this
argument for use in rebuttal.

As the plaintiff, Searles had the

burden of proving his case of breach of contract by a
preponderance of the evidence.

In his own brief, Searles admits

that "the party who has the affirmative burden of proof is
required to produce the first evidence on an issue, and at that
time should produce all his evidence in chief."

(Petition,

p.7).
To prevail on his breach of contract claim, Searles
was required to establish the existence of the contract, the
terms of the contract, his performance of these terms, and
breach by Dayna.

Searles failed to carry his burden of proof.

At the conclusion of Searles' presentation of the
evidence, the trial court granted Dayna's motion for involuntary
dismissal finding that Searles had failed to prove his case.
The court ruled as follows:
Count I, the literal contract claim.
There's been a failure to produce any
evidence that the defendant violated any
terms and conditions of the contract in
terminating the defendant. Defendant,
according to the evidence, construed in a
light most favorable for the plaintiff, was
terminated for cause.
(R. 396). Similarly, the trial court dismissed Searles' second
cause of action ruling as follows:

-3-

"As to the second count,

good faith and fair dealing, there is no evidence before the
Court that there was any unfair dealing or that there was any
bad faith by the defendant."

(R. 396-97).

Simply stated, the trial court found that Searles had
failed to establish a prima facie case of breach of contract or
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The trial court found it unnecessary to hear the evidence of
Dayna because Searles failed to carry his burden of proof.

If

Searles had additional evidence or legal argument to support his
claims, he should have presented that evidence in his case in
chief.
The trial court gave Searles full opportunity to
present his case.

As described more fully in Dayna's principal

brief, counsel for Dayna objected to the introduction of any
evidence by Searles that was offered to vary or contradict the
terms of the written employment agreement.
pp.19-21).

(Appellee's Brief,

Counsel for Searles insisted that the evidence was

not offered to vary the terms of the agreement, but only as
foundation and as evidence of whether or not Dayna acted in good
faith.

Searles had every opportunity to present the issue of

impossibility but failed to do so as demonstrated by the
following exchange:
MR. PERKINS:
of 7-P.

I move for the admission

-4-

MS. LEITH:
I would object to the
admission for any purpose other than to go
to the issue of good faith.
THE COURT:
Do you have any other
purposes for offering it?
MR. PERKINS:
Well, we have been
talking very narrowly about the issue of
good faith, your Honor. I think there's
also — there are also issues that have
related to good faith but that are involving
implied conditions to the employment
contract. I believe that it can be shown
that the company, by implication, said that
"We're going to provide additional
personnel, promotional money, money to hire
new people, and we're going to have product
ready to be sold and delivered to enable the
sales force to be able to meet the quota
goals."
THE COURT:
All right. I'll take
that to mean it's not being offered to vary
the term of the contract and with that
limitation in mind — what is it, 7?
MR. PERKINS:

Yes.

THE COURT:

7 is received.

(R. 319-20) (emphasis supplied).
Thus, Searles had every opportunity to argue that his
contractual obligations were excused or modified by the defense
of impossibility of performance.

The trial court specifically

asked counsel for Searles if his evidence was offered for any
purpose other than to go to the issue of good faith.

Even afte:

this direct invitation from the trial court to present any
additional legal theories, Searles failed to argue the defense
of impossibility of performance.

-5-

II.

The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance is
Inapplicable to the Present Case.
Even if Searles had asserted impossibility of

performance at trial and preserved the issue for appeal, Searles
could not prevail on his claim against Dayna.

Impossibility is

a contractual defense to liability and may not be asserted by a
party seeking to enforce the agreement.
The defense of impossibility recently has been
described by this Court as follows:
Under the contractual defense of
impossibility, an obligation is deemed
discharged if an unforseen event occurs
after formation of the contract and without
fault of the obligated party, which event
makes performance of the obligation
impossible or highly impracticable. The
rationale for this rule is founded on
principles of assent and basic equity.
Parties are ordinarily thought to have made
certain assumptions in visualizing their
agreement, and those assumptions comprise
part of the basis and extent of their
assent. The impossibility defense serves to
prevent enforcement where those assumptions,
and hence, the parties assent, prove to be
faulty.
Western Properties v. Southern Utah Aviation, Inc., 776 P.2d
657, 658 (Ct. App. Utah 1989) (footnotes omitted).1

1

This analysis is consistent with prior pronouncements
of the Supreme Court of Utah. See, e.g., Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho
Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) ("The doctrine of
impossibility of performance is one by which a party may be
relieved of performing an obligation under a contract where
supervening events, unforeseeable at the time the contract is
made, render performance of the contract impossible.") (footnote
omitted).
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Thus, the defense of impossibility serves to prevent
enforcement of a contract.

Even if the defense of impossibility

were applicable in this case, both Searles and Dayna would be
excused from performance.

While Searles would not be required

to meet the sales quota, Dayna would not be required to pay
Searles as if he had met the sales quota.

"A party to a

contract may not obtain an advantage from the fact that he is
unable to perform."

Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553 (Ct.

App. Utah 1987); accord Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Utah
1977).
The proper application of the defense of impossibility
is illustrated by the case of Western Properties v. Southern
Utah Aviation, Inc., 776 P.2d 657, 658 (Ct. App. Utah 1989).

In

Western, the plaintiff leased certain vacant land from Cedar
City located at the Cedar City Airport.

The plaintiff in turn

subleased part of the land to the defendants with a covenant
that the defendants would construct a maintenance building on
the land.

At the end of the sublease term, the building was to

become the property of the plaintiff.
The defendants applied to Cedar City for site plan
approval for the maintenance building, but the plan could not be
approved because a master plan for the airport as a whole had
not been approved.

The defendants defaulted in payment of rent

and abandoned the subleased land without ever constructing a
maintenance building on the land.
-7-

The plaintiff sued for unpaid rent and the value of
the building that it was to have received following the term of
the sublease.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim

for rent and the value of the building.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Utah affirmed.

The

court found that the defendants' obligation to construct the
building was discharged because it was impossible to construct
the building without the approval of Cedar City.

Similarly, the

court found that the defendants' obligation to pay rent on the
subleased land was discharged by the related doctrine of
frustration of purpose.

Although the defendants were not

precluded from occupying the subleased land, the land was
undeveloped and could not be used for the purpose contemplated
by the parties.

"Without a way of productively using the land,

the purpose of the leasehold was effectively frustrated."
at 659.

Id.

Accordingly, the covenant to pay rent was also

discharged.
In the present case, both Searles and Dayna
contemplated that Searles would reach the sales quota contained
in his employment contract.

Both parties made certain

assumptions concerning the potential demand for Dayna's products
and the availability of those products.
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If it were literally

impossible2 for Searles to perform, the contract itself would
become invalid based upon a lack of assent by the parties.

See

Western, 776 P.2d at 658.
III.

Searles Is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys' Fees
Because He Is not a Prevailing Party.
Searles argues that he is entitled to attorneys7 fees

based upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Utah in
Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992).

Searles

ignores the fact that he has not prevailed on any of his claims.
Even if Searles had prevailed on appeal, the appropriate remedy
would be to remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

Searles claim for attorneys' fees is entirely

without factual or legal support and this Court should not
consider it.
CONCLUSION
Searles has failed to carry his burden of establishing
that this Court improperly failed to consider the issue of
impossibility of performance in its decision to affirm the trial
court.

Similarly, Searles has failed to show that the trial

court erred in any of its rulings or that the case should be
remanded for further proceedings.

2

Accordingly, Dayna

It is important to note that Searles did not establish at
trial that it was literally impossible for him to reach the
sales quotas contained in the employment agreement.
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respectfully urges this Court to DENY the Petition for
Rehearing.
DATED this ^)hjL^
\JU day of December, 1993.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Jon E. Waddoups
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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any purpose other than to go to the issue of good faith,
THE COURT:

Do you have any other purposes for

offering it?
MR, PERKINS:

Well, we have been talking very

narrowly about the issue of good faith, your Honor.
think there's also —

I

there are also issues that have

related to good faith but that are involving implied
conditions to the employment contract.

I believe that it

can be shown that the company, by implication, said that
"We're going to provide additional personnel, promotional
money, money to hire new people, and we're going to have
product ready to be sold and delivered to enable the
sales force to be able to meet the quota goals."
THE COURT:

But does that relate to anything

that's an attempt to vary the express terms of the
contract?
Mft. PERKINS:

I don't think it varies the term.

It, again, goes to good faith by implying these things
would be done to enable the sales force to meet quota
and, if not done, it goes to whether or not the
termination clause of the employment agreement was
exercised in good faith or not.
THE COURT:

All right.

I'll take that to mean

it's not being offered to vary the term of the contract,
and with that limitation in mind —

what is it, 7?
64
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MR. PERKINS:

Q.

Yes.

THE COURT:

7 is received.

MS. LEITH:

Thank youf your Honor.

(By Mr. Perkins)

I'll direct your attention to

the third page of that document, which is an
organizational chart dated 9-30-88 in the left-hand upper
corner, and on the right side under Jim Walls, it shows
Western Area Sales Director, W. Searles, and it has four
locations, Los Angeles, San Jose, Dallas and Seattle.
Everywhere but the San Jose entry it shows sales open
fiscal year '89.
Now, does that entry mean that it's proposed to
add a sales employee under Mr. Searles in that location?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And so at that time there was only P. Sun.

That was someone who was an existing employee?
A.

Yes, Pam Sun.

Q.

Now, were these other three locations —

or did

these other three locations ever receive a sales
representative as projected?
A.

Los Angeles did.

I don't believe we ever hired

anybody in Dallas or Seattle.

May I note that Seattle

doesn't call for a sales person.

It calls for a support

person.
Q.

What's the difference between sales and
65
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1

either a motion for a protective order by the defendant

2

or motion to compel by the plaintiff, I ordered that

3

information concerning other employees be produced so

4

that Mr. Searles would have the opportunity to put on

5

evidence that his termination was pretextual.

6

evidence came before me today.

7

No such

With those prefatory matters in mind, I'm going

8

to grant the motion for the following reasons:

9

Count 1, the literal contract claim.

JO

been a failure to produce any evidence that the defendant

11

violated any terms and conditions of the contract in

12

terminating the defendant.

13

evidence, construed in a light most favorable for the

14

plaintiff, was terminated for cause.

15

the contract, not by any moral considerations or anything

16

like that.

17

established, in part, by failure to meet quotas.

IS

There's

Defendant, according to the

Cause is defined by

Cause in this particular contract is

The evidence unequivocally indicates that the

19 I

defendant concedes that the quotas were not met.

20

Therefore, the contract provision on cause could be

2i

invoked, it was invoked, and the termination was had, and

22

the termination does not constitute a violation of the

23

contract.

24
25

As to the second count, good faith and fair
dealing, there is no evidence before the Court that there
141
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1

was any unfair dealing or that there was any bad faith by

2

the defendant.

3

requirement of the defendant to provide product, per se.

4

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however,

5

would prohibit the defendant from failing to provide

6

product in bad faith.

7

that there was bad faith in doing so.

S

The evidence does not establish any

There is no evidence to suggest

There is, however, evidence that would

9

suggest —

and not to credit it or discredit it, all I'm

10

saying is there's been a failure of evidence.

11 I

is evidence to suggest that the failure of providing

12

product was somewhat natural to this industry in the

13

sense that that occurs from time to time and that hope

14

springs eternal, evidently, in this industry, and

15

frequently prognostications are not met.

But there

16

The conduct generating the failure to provide

17

product and necessarily the inability of the plaintiff,

IS

through no fault of his, to meet the quotas was due to

19

inaccurate projections.

20

Now, it would be one thing if these quotas were

2i

set after the signing of the contract or that something

22

occurred thereafter by the defendant and affirmatively

23

and in bad faith or unfair interfering with defendant to

24

meet his quotas.

25

case.

There is no evidence of that in this

142
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